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1. Introduction 
A substantial empirical literature finds that bank diversification into non-interest 
income areas leads to banking sector instability (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; DeYoung and 
Rice, 2004; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Stiroh, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008a; De 
Jonghe, 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Moshirian et al., 2011; Brunnermeier et 
al., 2011; and DeYoung and Torna, 2013). The link between riskier investment banking 
revenue and the 2007-8 crisis has also prompted a series of reforms in the US and Europe 
(Dodd Frank Act, 2010; Liikanen Report, 2012 and the Independent Commission on Banking 
– Vickers Report, 2011) that recommend restrictions on various banks' non-interest income-
based activities (International Monetary Fund, 2011).  
While the academic literature on bank diversification has focused on performance and 
stability issues associated with non-traditional banking activities, little attention has been paid 
to the potential consequences of income diversity for lending. This is somewhat surprising 
given that combining both traditional lending activities and non-interest businesses can affect 
bank/borrower relationships which form the major components of banks’ charter value. It can 
also lead to agency problems, loss of focus and the cross-selling of fee and commission-based 
services as well as potential cost savings through the realization of scope economies.  
 Relationships with clients influence banks’ performance. Banks can collect 
information (beyond that available publicly) over time via multiple interactions with the same 
customer (Berger, 1999; Boot, 2000). Boot (2000) emphasizes that relationship banking is not 
limited to lending and can cover other financial services. Hence, expanding the scope of client 
relationships may improve a bank’s lending position, as it can provide opportunities to reach a 
wider array of potential borrowers and more information on client quality. Banks may also 
have the ability to monitor borrowers that are tied by non-interest activities more closely and 
more efficiently. Moreover, information obtained from offering multiple products can build 
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new, as well as enhance, existing relationships. Such  relationships can potentially increase 
banks’ franchise value and hence increase potential indirect costs of financial distress, leading 
to more prudent behavior in lending and investment activities (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; 
Demsetz et al., 1996 and Gonzalez, 2005  show the negative relationship between banks’ 
charter value and risk-taking). 
Boot (2003) argues that scale and scope expansion leads to a form of strategic 
positioning that drives industry consolidation. He points out that distribution channels are 
essential and that technological developments that make it more effective to interrogate 
business-line databases encourage scope expansion.  
The building of relationships can mitigate risk, as illustrated by Puri et al. (2011) who 
show that borrowers with prior credit relationships (with German savings banks) default less. 
By examining 18,000 bank loans to small Belgian firms, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) 
also show that interest rates tend to fall as the scope of the relationship expands. Hellmann et 
al. (2008) find that prior relationships with early stage venture capital firms increase the 
chances of bank loan origination. Firms may also benefit from established bank relationships 
by signalling their quality resulting in lower loan rates.  
Incentives to cross-sell fee and non-interest based products are higher when margins 
on traditional intermediation are low. Carbo and Rodriguez (2007) show that income from 
non-traditional activities influence net interest margins through possible cross-subsidization 
effects and Lepetit et al. (2008b) also find that banks may charge lower rates on loans (under-
pricing credit risk) if they expect to obtain additional fees from borrowers. Such behavior 
could, therefore, undermine banks' major role in the financial system. Sound monitoring of 
borrowers and accurate loan-pricing are essential for the banking industry and the economy as 
a whole. Banks are expected to produce and convey information on the quality of borrowers 
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which could be biased if non-interest activities provide incentives for weaker loan screening 
and monitoring.  
Moreover, a greater reliance on non-interest activities may increase credit risk due to 
agency problems or/and a loss of focus. Several studies show that agency problems and 
information asymmetries stemming from activity diversification outweigh the benefits from 
scope economies (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elyasiani and Wang, 2009; Akhigbe and 
Stevenson 2010). Others, such as Petersen and Rajan (1995) note that banks extend credit 
subsidies to young firms and expect to offset the expected loss through future long-run rents. 
In a similar vein, a diversified commercial bank may decide to grant loss-making loans to 
cross-sell profit-making fee and commission-based services. Banks expanding into non-
interest income activities may also lose their focus on lending. Moreover, lower credit 
exposure may encourage managers to be less conservative in their loan-granting activities.  
In this paper, we investigate the impact on lending of banks’ diversification into six 
major business lines
1
 which we identify as playing an important role among a broader array of 
non-interest income items. They range from activities such as fiduciary where clients entrusts 
funds for asset management by the banks, to loan servicing which is directly attached to 
lending. Generally, these business lines provide banks with the opportunity to have access to 
more private information and can enable them to reach a wider array of potential customers. 
Moreover, they are also likely to expand the scope of relationships with clients beyond merely 
lending-deposit activities, providing more soft information, financial resources and also 
enhancing bank franchise values. Alternatively, they may cause agency problems, loss of 
focus or risk mispricing. We examine the influence of these activities on banks’ lending in 
terms of loan quality and interest spread. We also investigate the role of bank 
                                                 
1
 Fiduciary, life insurance and annuity sales, other insurance services, loan servicing, loans sale and service 
charges on deposit accounts. 
 5 
charter/franchise value as well as the possible existence of cost complementarity or 
diseconomies of joint production between non-interest income activities and lending. 
We use quarterly data on 8,287 U.S. commercial banks and our data span from 2003 to 
2010 covering the period before and after the 2007-2008 financial crises. Since the U.S. 
banking system is dominated by small banks, we also study banks with less than $100 million 
in total assets (3,116‘micro’ commercial banks) separately from the rest of our sample. 
Our credit risk analysis for commercial banks with total assets above $100 million 
indicates that among our various non-interest income activities only an increase in income 
from fiduciary activities lowers credit risk. In other words, banks that manage clients 
investments (asset management) have lower credit risk. The impact is more pronounced 
during the post-crisis period and this finding is robust across different specifications, credit 
risk proxies and estimation techniques. Further investigation also shows a positive association 
between fiduciary income and bank’s franchise value. We do not find significant evidence to 
support the conjecture of cross-subsidization between traditional intermediation and non-
interest income activities except for fiduciary activities after the crisis with higher income 
shares from this activity being associated with lower lending-deposit spreads. This result is 
particularly important, since previous studies (Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007 and Lepetit et al., 
2008b) typically find evidence of cross-subsidization effects.   
Our analysis of micro commercial banks (those with assets under $100 million) 
provides us with little evidence to support any significant link between non-interest income 
activities and credit risk, and price cross-subsidization
2
. Finally, we investigate for possible 
pair-wise cost complementarity or alternatively diseconomy of joint production between 
lending (both secured and unsecured) and non-interest income activities. The analysis shows 
that micro commercial banks suffer from diseconomy of joint production, whereas non-micro 
                                                 
2
 Non-interest income activities have too small weight in total operating income of these banks to affect their 
lending. 
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commercial banks neither suffer from diseconomy of joint production nor benefit from cost 
complementarity (non-jointness). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines our 
methodology and econometric specifications. Section 3 describes the data and summary 
statistics. Section 4 discusses the results and finally section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Econometric Specification and Methodology 
Initially, we investigate the impact of non-interest income activities on lending from 
two perspectives, namely, on how it influences credit risk and interest spreads. For this 
purpose, we estimate the following models based on Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Carbo 
and Rodriguez (2007). The variables we consider are the determinants of credit risk and 
lending-deposit spread highlighted in the literature (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Clair, 1992; 
Angbazo, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004; Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008b; Foos, et al., 2010): 
Credit_Riski,t          =  α0 + α1×Credit_Riski,t-1 + ∑     
 
   ×Non-interest_Income_Activitiesk,i,t +  
α3×Capitali,t + α4×Inefficiencyi,t + α5×Risk_Weighted_Assets i,t +   
α6×Loan_Commitmenti,t-1 + α7×Loan_Growthi,t-1 + 
α8×Sizei,t-1 + α9×Log(Age)i,t-1 +  
α10×HHIj,i + α11×Home_Price_Growthj,t + α12×Income_Growthj,t-1 +  
∑                    
 
    + Ɛi,t                                                                  (1) 
 
Spreadi,t                  =  β0 + β1×Spreadi,t-1 + ∑     
 
   ×Non-interest_Income_Activitiesk,i,t +  
β3×Capitali,t + β4×Infficiencyi,t +  
β5×Credit_Riski,t + β6×Liquidity_Riski,t + β7×Interest_Rate_Riski,t +  
β8×Core_Depositi,t + β9×Loan_Commitmenti,t + β10×Wagei,t +  
β11×Sizei,t + β12×Log(Age)i,t +  
β13×HHIj,t + β14×Home_Price_Growthj,t + β15×Income_Growthj,t +  
∑                    
 
    + ƞi,t                                                                  (2) 
  
 where individual banks, time dimension and U.S. states in which they operate are 
represented by i, t and j subscripts, respectively. Variation in credit risk (Credit Risk) and 
lending-borrowing spread (Spread) are modelled in Equations (1) and (2) as a function of our 
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variables of interest, namely, income shares from various non-interest income activities 
including fiduciary activities, life insurance and annuities, other insurance services and loan 
servicing. These are activities that are expected to increase the scope of banking operations 
and extend the relationship with borrowers. Moreover, we also take into account non-interest 
income from loan sales and also service charges on deposit accounts. The former represents 
how active banks are in their loan portfolio management and the latter how actively clients do 
banking (the scale of relationship) and/or banks’ market power. Both models also include a 
range of bank-level, U.S. state-level and time control variables.  
 We use a dynamic panel setting for our study as suggested by Carbo and Rodriguez, 
2007 and Berger and DeYoung, 1997. This allows us to address the persistence in bank risk-
taking which is also pointed out by previous literature (Delis and Kouretas, 2011, among 
others). We estimate the models using the fixed effect technique, similar to Loutskiana 
(2011)
3
. 
 
2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In model (1) we use the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (Non-performing 
Loans) as a proxy for Credit Risk. Non-performing loans consist of non-accrual loans and 
loans which are past due for 90 days or more and still accruing. As a robustness check, we 
consider the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (Loan Loss Reserve) and the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to average gross loans (Loan Loss Provision). The former represents 
managers’ appraisal of the loan portfolio quality. It accounts for both non-performing and 
performing loans. The latter is a flow proxy for loan quality as it shows the quarterly 
                                                 
3
 In the dynamic panel specification, the lagged dependent variable becomes endogenous when the sample has a 
small time dimension (the literature considers the problem for a sample with less than 15 time periods, whereas 
in this study we have 32 time periods). Roodman (2009) also suggests applying difference and system GMM 
techniques to panels with small T and large N. He points out that with large T, a dynamic panel bias becomes 
insignificant and the straightforward fixed effect technique can be used. In fact, the number of instruments in 
difference and system GMM tends to explode with T. 
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adjustment of loan loss reserves and loans write-off. We also use the more generic Credit Risk 
proxy, namely the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets (Risk Weighted Assets) which is 
considered by the Basel Accord to measure the riskiness of banks’ assets and it also accounts 
for off balance sheet items (Cordell and King, 1995; Jones and King, 1995 and Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997). These proxies are widely used in the literature as accounting-based credit 
risk indicators (for instance Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Gonzalez, 2005; Carbo and 
Rodriguez, 2007; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Fiordelisi, et al., 2011).  
For our Spread model (2) we use the lending-borrowing spread otherwise known as 
the  net interest spread and defined as 
                     
                            
 
                      
                                          
 (Spread) following Carbo and 
Rodriguez (2007) and Lepetit et al. (2008b).  
 
2.2. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
On the basis of the breakdown provided in the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC) 031 Reports of Income and Condition (Call Reports), we 
identify six major non-interest income business lines that may have an impact on customer 
credit relationships and banks’ lending4.  
1) Income from fiduciary activities (Fiduciary). 
Clients using fiduciary services have entrusted assets to the bank for management or 
safekeeping, and hence are expected to be relatively risk-averse. Moreover, banks do 
not have an unconditional obligation to pay a pre-determined interest rate; instead, 
they simply receive a fee for the services. The trust of such clients is worthy and 
valuable for the banks and is likely to increases banks’ franchise value. We expect that 
                                                 
4
 Due to a lack of data, we are unable to take into account income from venture capital activities. Moreover, the 
data on securities brokerage and investment banking is available merely as of 2007 onward. Because we focus 
primarily on lending we do not analyze various other items of non-interest income which are not expected to 
expand the scope of clients’ relationships. These other items include trading revenues and other assets sales.  
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banks with more Fiduciary Activities have less incentive for risky lending and 
excessive risk-taking
5
 because of the higher bankruptcy costs in case of failure 
(Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990).  
2) Earnings on/increases in value of cash surrender value of life insurance policies plus 
fees and commissions from annuity sales (Life Insurance).  
Clients can establish a long-run relationship and provide banks with fairly stable 
funding by entrusting cash surrender value on their policies to the bank. This financial 
resource is likely to enhance the bank’s position in lending.  
3) Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and income from other 
(non-life) insurance activities (Other Insurance Services). 
 Other insurance income provides banks with financial resources (pool of premiums) 
that may also be linked to lending. Banks that have more general insurance business  
are likely to be aware of the items insured – autos, residential and commercial 
property, other high value goods – that may require re-financing in the future and 
therefore can suggest lending opportunities. In addition, existing borrowers may 
request insurance services which might strengthen relationships and therefore enhance 
banks’ lending quality. 
4) Net servicing fees (Loan Servicing). 6 
 Servicers can collect soft information and identify borrowers who regularly fulfil their 
repayment obligations and this information can be used by banks for future loan 
origination. However, to collect more late fees, servicing companies may target 
borrowers less likely to make timely instalments (Wagner, 2009). Moreover, having 
                                                 
5
 It can be argued that clients have a strong preference for using reputable and conservative banks for their 
fiduciary activities. We address this causal relationship in sub-sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
6
 Servicing companies typically receive a percentage of the outstanding amount of the loans they service. 
Normally, they do not own the loans. Services include statements, impounds, collections, tax reporting, and other 
requirements. Any person with a mortgage loan pays her scheduled instalments to a loan servicing firm. Most of 
mortgages are backed by Federal housing programs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
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loan servicers, banks may undermine loan quality and originate more mortgage loans 
while under-pricing risk. As such, the relationship between Loan Servicing and 
lending quality is indeterminate prior to estimation. 
5) Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases and net securitization income (Loan 
Sales). 
Income from Loans Sale may show how active banks manage their loan portfolio; 
however, banks with more effective presence in the loan sales market may target 
riskier loans. As such, the relationship between Loans Sale and loan quality is not 
clear. 
6) Service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices, income and fees from the 
printing and sale of checks, income and fees from automated teller machines and bank 
card and credit card interchange fees (Service Charge).  
Service Charge represents the scale of relationships as it can show the volume of 
interactions with clients and how much income can be obtained from such activities 
(banks’ market power). Hence, we expect that banks with more income from these 
services might have a greater charter value.  Alternatively, a higher service charge 
might be due to a bank’s pricing policy or even the  quality of clients – riskier clients 
will likely pay higher service fees, suggesting a reverse relationship with franchise 
value.   
Our aim is to analyse the implications for credit risk and spread resulting from 
variation in the aforementioned non-interest income activities. The income from such 
activities is measured as a percentage of total net operating income following the existing 
literature (Stiroh, 2004 among others). For Equation (2), however, we scale the non-interest 
income items by total assets in lieu of total net operating income, since the latter includes net 
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interest income (alongside non-interest income) and this may cause a mechanical inverse 
relationship between the share of non-interest income in total operating income and Spread
7
.  
 
2.3. CONTROL VARIABLES 
The ratio of equity capital to total assets (Capital) is controlled for in both models. On 
the one hand, higher Capital is associated with lower moral hazard problems and better 
capitalized banks have greater monitoring incentives (Diamond, 1984). On the other hand, 
equity capital provides banks with an enhanced capacity for risk-taking. It can represent 
equity-holders’ risk preferences (McShane and Sharpe, 1985 and Maudos and De Guevara, 
2004) and banks with a higher capital ratio may target riskier activities and/or a higher spread 
to compensate for the higher cost of equity compared to debt finance. Berger (1995) argues 
that capital requirements translate into a premium on margins. We also control for cost 
inefficiency represented by the ratio of non-interest expense to total operating revenue 
(Inefficiency) in our models. Less efficient banks are expected to have lower loan quality due 
to poorer monitoring. They might even have greater incentives for risk-taking (Kwan and 
Eisenbeis, 1997). More inefficient banks are expected to increase their spread to cover their 
higher costs (Altunbas et al., 2001).  
We include the ratio of the face value of unused credit lines and loan commitments to 
total assets (Loan Commitment) in our analysis. Borrowers of banks with higher Loan 
Commitment face, on average, lower liquidity shocks and have the capacity to be more 
leveraged. As such, we expect a negative relationship between Loan Commitment and Credit 
Risk. Berg et al. (2013) show that credit lines act as insurance for borrowers against liquidity 
shocks and the related fees including commitment fees smooth borrowing costs across 
                                                 
7
 An increase in non-interest income share might be due to a decline in net interest income caused by a decrease 
in Spread. 
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different scenarios (namely, the presence and absence of liquidity shocks). As such, higher 
Loan Commitment may represent greater borrowing cost smoothing and lower Spread.  
In our Credit Risk model (1) we control for Risk Weighted Assets, as non-performing 
loans depend on the riskiness of portfolio structure and Risk Weighted Assets captures a 
number of risk factors such as borrowers’ type and the existence of collateral (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997). 
We add the quarterly growth rate of gross loans (Loan Growth) to the Credit Risk 
model, since the literature shows a negative relationship between credit expansion and loan 
quality (Clair, 1992; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006; Foos, et al., 2010).  
In the Spread model (model 2), we introduce a proxy for credit risk (Loan Loss 
Provision), the ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities (to capture liquidity risk) and the 
difference between the annualized federal funds rate and the implicit interest rate on customer 
deposits as a measure of interest rate risk. We expect higher credit, liquidity or interest rate 
risk to translate into higher Spread (Angbazo, 1997; Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007 and Saunders 
and Schumacher, 2000 among others). The share of core deposits in total liabilities (Core 
Deposit) is also included in Equation (2), as Spread depends on the structure of debt 
financing. We also consider the salaries and employee benefits divided by number of full time 
equivalent employees (Wage) as a proxy for employees’ expertise. Banks with greater 
expertise are expected to have a higher Spread, since they are expected to offer more 
specialized and higher valued services. 
We also control for bank size by including the logarithm of total assets (Size) in both 
models. Size can have several impacts on Credit Risk and Spread: Large and small banks have 
different business models, the former relying more heavily on non-interest generating 
activities given their greater capacity to benefit from diversification and scale economies 
(Hughes et al., 2001). Larger banks may also hold riskier loan portfolios to benefit from safety 
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net subsidies (Kane, 2010). Moreover, bigger banks mainly deal with larger and more 
transparent borrowers, while small banks are more likely to lend to opaque firms which may 
be more risky. Alternatively, large borrowers generally have easier access to financial markets 
as a substitute for bank lending. Hence, large banks could face higher competition, resulting 
in greater risk-taking and lower spreads. The logarithm of the bank’s age (Log(Age)) is 
expected to capture the impact of longevity and hence experience on the bank’s Credit Risk 
and Spread. 
In both models, we attempt to capture state-level heterogeneity by including indexes 
for banking market concentration (HHI), house prices (House Price Growth) and growth in 
personal income (Income Growth). Finally, yearly fixed effects are controlled for by 
introducing seven year dummies. Table A1 in the appendix outlines the variables used in our 
models.  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 Our empirical investigation is based on a sample of 8,287 commercial banks domiciled 
in the U.S. The sample is constructed on a quarterly basis between 2003 and 2010
8
, providing 
a total of 211,161 bank-quarter observations. Bank-level data is collected from the web-site of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the annualized federal funds rate is obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, state-level home price indexes and personal income data 
are retrieved from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, respectively. The data on market capitalization is collected from the SNL 
database. We exclude banks that have been in operation for less than 3 years and banks with 
no loans and deposits. Outliers are removed from the sample by winsorizing up to 2% of each 
                                                 
8
 The time frame starts from 2003, since U.S. banks provide detailed information on various non-interest income 
activities since then. The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago has not posted the CALL report data on its web-site 
from 2011 onward. 
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tail
9
. All the variables are de-seasonalized
10
 and income statement figures have been 
annualized. We also remove banks with negative non-interest income ratios
11
. We also study 
two samples of banks: 3,116 very small banks (80,277 observations) with less than $100 
million in total assets (Micro Commercial Banks). The second sample consists of the 
remaining 5,171 commercial banks (Non-Micro Commercial Banks) with 130,884 
observations. The reason for examining the smallest banks separately is that the U.S. banking 
system is dominated by small banks with a relatively different business model. As banks 
become larger their funding strategy, loan composition and income structure tend to change.  
Table I (PANEL A) presents the descriptive statistics for Micro and Non-Micro 
Commercial Banks. The mean equality tests show a significant difference between the two 
groups of banks. The figures show that Non-performing Loans of Non-Micro Commercial 
Banks equals 1.12% which is significantly higher than that of Micro Commercial Banks 
(0.92%); nevertheless,  Non-Micro Commercial Banks hold on average less Loan Loss 
Reserve (1.44% vs. 1.55%) than Micro Commercial Banks. Our flow proxy of Credit Risk, 
Loan Loss Provision, is also higher for Non-Micro Commercial Banks (0.56% vs. 0.35%). 
Non-Micro Commercial Banks have on average more Risk Weighted Assets (71.73%) 
but lower Spread (3.54%) than Micro Commercial Banks (with 65.32% Risk Weighted Assets 
and 3.67% Spread). Non-Micro Commercial Banks are on average less capitalized and more 
efficient than Micro Commercial Banks. Non-Micro Commercial Banks are also less reliant 
on core deposits. Moreover, Non-Micro Commercial Banks hold on average less liquid assets 
and also pay more interest to deposit holders than Micro Commercial Banks. 
                                                 
9
 We winsorize the data to the extent that the sample lies in the (mean - 6×S.D., mean + 6×S.D.) domain. Hence, 
each variable is winsorized based on how dispersed its distribution is and how flat the tails are. 
10
 We regress bank level data and the interest rate on three quarter dummies and use the residual as the de-
seasonalized value. The state-level data (Home Price Growth and Personal Income Growth) have already been 
de-seasonalized. 
11
 Totally, 195 observations on non-interest income scaled by total operating income are excluded from our 
sample. We also scale the non-interest income components by total assets, as a robustness check, in which case 
we do not need to exclude these observations. 
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 Loan Commitment is on average higher for Non-Micro Commercial Banks. Their 
gross loans grow at a faster rate and they pay on average a higher salary to their employees as 
compared to Micro Commercial Banks. The average age of Non-Micro Commercial Banks is 
about 66 years, which is approximately 10 years lower than the average age of Micro 
Commercial Banks. The average state-level assets market share of Micro and Non-Micro 
Commercial Banks are 0.08% and 0.7%, respectively. The share of non-interest income 
activities in total operating income of Non-Micro Commercial Banks is 17.53%, whereas the 
share is 14.08% for Micro Commercial Banks which rely significantly more on interest 
income
12
. 
[TABLE I] 
The second part of the table illustrates the income shares of our variables of interest in 
total operating income, i.e. Fiduciary, Life Insurance, Other Insurance Services, Loan 
Servicing, Loan Sale and Service Charge. The descriptive statistics show that the income 
share for Fiduciary is 0.90% for Non-Micro Commercial Banks, while it is merely 0.06% for 
Micro Commercial Banks. Life Insurance, Loan Servicing and Loan Sale have a greater 
income share in total operating income of Non-Micro Commercial Banks, whereas the income 
share of Other Insurance Services and Service Charge is higher for Micro Commercial Banks.  
The third part of the table exhibits other components of non-interest income. Income 
share of Securities Brokerage, Investment Banking and Trading have greater share in total 
operating income of Non-Micro Commercial banks; whereas Other Assets Sale has, on 
average, a negative weight in total operating income of Non-Micro Commercial Banks and 
almost zero weight for Micro Commercial Banks. Other non-interest income activities account 
for 4.45% and 3.11% of total operating income of Non-Micro and Micro Commercial banks, 
                                                 
12
 Stiroh (2006) quotes 23.9% as the Noninterest_Income of traded BHCs operating between 1997 and 2004. 
Elyasiani and Wang (2009) report 24% as the Noninterest_Income of listed BHCs operating between 2001-2005 
period. The average bank considered in their studies is larger and hence more diversified than the average bank 
studied in our paper.    
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respectively. The last part of the table illustrates our proxies for bank franchise value. The 
Market to Book Value of Non-Micro Commercial Banks is on average 127%, whereas the 
market capitalization of Micro Commercial Banks is on average slightly lower than the book 
value of their equity capital. Tobin’s Q of Non-Micro Commercial Banks stands marginally 
above 100% (102.9%) and it almost equals 100% for Micro Commercial Banks.    
PANEL B of the table presents the state-level indicators including the market 
concentration index represented by HHI, Home Price Index Growth and Income Growth. The 
home price index, on average, has experienced a 0.55% quarterly growth during the study 
period. Personal income has also grown, on average, at the rate of 1.06% in the 2003-2010 
time period. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. CREDIT RISK  
We estimate the Credit Risk model (Equation (1)) using our quarterly panel data to 
investigate whether non-interest income activities have any significant impact on banks’ loan 
quality. We apply the fixed effect technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
Table II presents the estimation results for the 5,106 Non-Micro Commercial Banks and the 
2,792 Micro Commercial Banks during the period under study.  
Columns (1) to (7) display the results for Non-Micro Commercial Banks. Column (1) 
illustrates the estimation where we regress Non-performing Loans as the Credit Risk proxy on 
non-interest income activities, namely Fiduciary, Life Insurance, Other Insurance Services, 
Loan Servicing, Loan Sale and Service Charge while controlling for Capital, Inefficiency, 
Risk Weighted Assets and year fixed effects. In column (2), we try to capture heterogeneities 
caused by loan portfolio characteristics by adding Loan Commitment and Loan Growth to our 
model. We introduce Size and Log(Age) to the model in column (3). Finally, state-level 
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variations represented by HHI, Home Price Growth and Income Growth are controlled for in 
the fourth column. In all specifications the results show significant and negative coefficients 
for Fiduciary, Other Insurance Services and Service Charge implying that income from these 
businesses appears to lower Credit Risk. As a robustness check, in columns (5) and (6) we use 
Loan Loss Reserve and Loan Loss Provision as proxies for Credit Risk in lieu of Non-
performing Loan. The results support our finding for Fiduciary Activities; however, the 
coefficients of Other Insurance Services and Service Charge appear insignificant in column 
(6) where we use Loan Loss Provision. Moreover, we scale the non-interest income items by 
total assets in lieu of total net operating income and re-estimate our model. The results are in 
line with our previous findings: Fiduciary negatively affects Credit Risk. Column (7) displays 
the result when we use a more generic proxy for Credit Risk, i.e. Risk Weighted Assets which 
depicts a negative association with Fiduciary and Service Charge. As a further robustness 
check and following Thompson (2011)
13
, the standard errors are clustered by quarter. The 
results support our previous findings
14
. 
Overall, the outcome implies that income from Fiduciary Activities appears to lower 
Credit Risk. The result is also economically meaningful. A one percent increase, evaluated at 
the mean, in the income share of Fiduciary in total net operating income lowers Non-
performing Loans on average, by 0.010%. The average Non-performing Loans is 1.12%, so 
the effects are economically significant and equal to a 0.9% (0.9%=
      
     
) fall in the average 
Non-performing Loans. 
Among the control variables, we find that more capitalized or inefficient banks have, 
on average, greater Credit Risk. We also observe a positive effect of Risk Weighted Assets on 
                                                 
13
 Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) both claim that when the dimensions of panel are extremely 
unbalanced, there is no need to double cluster at all; however, the former believes that single-clustering on the 
more frequent dimension (bank in our case) is almost identical to clustering by both dimensions, whereas the 
latter argues that in this case, single-clustering on the less frequent dimension (time in our case) removes the 
bias.  
14
 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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Credit Risk.  Loan Commitment and Loan Growth are associated with lower Credit Risk, 
(except for Risk Weighted Assets for which we find positive coefficients in-line with 
expectations). Larger or older banks have higher Credit Risk whereas younger or older banks 
have greater Risk Weighted Assets. We find that an increase in Home Price Growth or Income 
Growth appears to lower Credit Risk. Finally, column (8) reports the estimation of our model 
for Micro Commercial Banks where we find no significant relationship between any of our 
non-interest income activities and credit risk. 
[TABLE II] 
 
4.2. SPREAD  
In this sub-section, we investigate the relationship between non-interest income 
activities (Fiduciary Activities, Life Insurance, Other Insurance Services, Loan Servicing, 
Loan Sale and Service Charge)
15
 and Spread. We use the fixed effect technique with standard 
errors clustered at the bank level. Table III presents the estimation results of the Equation (2) 
using quarterly data of 5,106 Non-Micro Commercial Banks and 2,788 Micro Commercial 
Banks. 
Columns (1) to (5) illustrate the regression results for Non-Micro Commercial Banks. 
In the first column, we regress Spread on non-interest income activities, while controlling for 
Capital, Inefficiency and year dummies. The result shows a positive association of Fiduciary, 
Life Insurance and Other Insurance Services, Loan Sale and Service Charge with Spread; 
however, the coefficient of Fiduciary appears insignificant in the second column where we 
control for Loan Loss Provision, Liquid Asset and Interest Rate Risk. In column (3), we 
introduce Core Deposit, Loan Commitment and Wage in our model. In this specification, 
Other Insurance Services appears insignificant. Size and banks’ age are added to the model in 
                                                 
15
 Scaled by total assets in lieu of total operating income to avoid the negative mechanical relationship with 
Spread. 
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the fourth column. Column (5) displays the estimation result when we include HHI, Home 
Price Growth and Income Growth. In all five specifications, the results show a positive 
association of Life Insurance, Loan Sale and Service Charge with Spread. We study our 
Micro Commercial Banks sub-sample in column (6) and find a positive relationship of 
Fiduciary (at the ten percent significance level) and Service Charge with Spread. 
The results also show that more capitalized or efficient banks have a higher Spread. A 
higher Loan Loss Provision translates into a higher Spread. Banks with more Liquid Asset 
(i.e. lower liquidity risk) have a lower Spread. Core Deposit depicts a positive association 
with Spread. We find a positive relationship between Loan Commitment and Spread which is 
contrary to our expectation. A higher Wage is associated with a higher Spread. Larger banks 
have, on average, lower Spread, whereas older banks have, on average, a higher Spread. 
Spread is higher in states with a faster Home Price Growth. Finally, we observe a negative 
relationship between Income Growth and Spread.  
Overall, we find no evidence to support the cross-subsidization conjecture, but also we 
find that an increase in Life Insurance, Loan Sale or Service Charge is associated with an 
increase in Spread.  
 [TABLE III] 
 
4.3. CRISIS AND POST CRISIS PERIODS 
We find a robust relationship between fiduciary activities and banks’ credit risk. As a 
further analysis, in this sub-section, we explore the relationship between Fiduciary and our 
dependent variables, namely Credit Risk proxies and Spread, during the crisis and afterwards. 
Using the definition provided by the Bank for International Settlements (2010), we split our 
sample period to three sub-samples: pre-crisis (January 2003 to June 2007), acute-crisis (July 
2007 to March 2009) and post-crisis periods (April 2009 to December 2010). Table IV 
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presents the results of our analysis for the three sub-periods, using quarterly data of 4,371 
Non-Micro Commercial Banks.  
Column (1) illustrates the estimation of the Credit Risk Model (Equation (1)), using 
Non-performing Loans as the dependent variable. We use three dummy variables of Pre, 
Acute and Post
16
 and replace Fiduciary with its interaction terms with the three dummies. We 
also replace our year fixed effects with Acute and Post dummy variables. The result shows 
that the impact of Fiduciary on Non-performing Loans is slightly stronger during the post-
crisis period. In the second column, we use Loan Loss Reserve in lieu of Non-performing 
Loans and find almost the same impact across acute and post crisis periods. In column (3), we 
use Loan Loss Provision as another proxy for Credit Risk and also find that the impact of 
Fiduciary on Credit Risk is more pronounced during the post-crisis period. Column (4) 
displays our analysis when Risk Weighted Assets is used as the dependent variable. Similar to 
our previous findings, we find a stronger effect of Fiduciary during the post-crisis period. 
Finally, in the fifth column we estimate our Spread model (Equation (2)), where we replace 
Fiduciary with its three interaction terms with Pre, Acute and Post. The analysis shows that 
during the post-crisis period banks with more Fiduciary income have on average a lower 
Spread.     
[TABLE IV] 
 
4.4. FIDUCIARY ACTIVITIES AND CREDIT RISK – CAUSALITY TESTS 
We find that fiduciary activities can lower credit risk; however, it might be argued that 
clients have a strong preference for using reputable and conservative banks for their fiduciary 
activities. In this sub-section, we address this causal relationship, using the Granger causality 
test (1969) which is widely applied in the literature (Berger, 1995; Rossi, et al., 2009; 
                                                 
16
 Pre takes the value of one for the period before the third quarter of 2007 and zero otherwise. Acute takes the 
value one for the period between the third quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009 and zero otherwise. Post 
takes the value of one for the period after the first quarter of 2009 and zero otherwise. 
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Fiordelisi et al. 2011, among others). We adopt the Berger and DeYoung (1997) model to set 
up the following equations to study the inter-temporal relationships between Fiduciary and 
Credit Risk: 
Credit_Riski,t          = f(Credit_Riski,lag, Fiduciaryi,lag, Capitali,lag, Inefficiencyi,lag,  
Risk_Weighted_Assetsi,lag, HHIj,t, Home_Price_Growthj,t,  
Income_Growthj,t, ∑              
 
   ) + Ɛi,t                                            (3) 
 
Fiduciaryi,t             = g(Credit_Riski,lag, Fiduciaryi,lag, Capitali,lag, Inefficiencyi,lag,  
Risk_Weighted_Assetsi,lag, HHIj,t , Home_Price_Growthj,t,  
Income_Growthj,t, ∑              
 
   ) + ζi,t                                            (4) 
 
Where the individual banks, time dimension and states are represented by i, t and j subscripts, 
respectively. On the right-hand-side of Equations (3) and (4), we use the lagged value of 
Credit Risk, Fiduciary, Capital, Inefficiency and Risk Weighted Assets while controlling for 
state-level variables and year dummies. Table V presents the estimation of our equations 
using the fixed effect technique. In the first column, we define three lags for the right-hand-
side variables and estimate Equation (3). The three lags of Fiduciary appear with negative 
coefficients and we reject the null hypothesis that the summation of all three lags equals to 
zero. This shows the long-run negative causation of Fiduciary on Credit Risk. In column (2), 
we consider four lags for the right-hand-side variables and find similar results. The results 
also show that Capital negatively, but Inefficiency positively, Granger cause Credit Risk. In 
column (2), we also observe that in the long-run more Risk Weighted Assets translates into 
greater Credit Risk. 
 Columns (3) and (4) illustrate our estimations of Equation (4) using three and four 
lags, respectively. We find that Credit Risk positively Granger causes Fiduciary. Hence, we 
do not find any evidence suggesting that banks successful in lending attract more fiduciary 
services. We also observe the long-run negative causation of Capital and Inefficiency on 
Fiduciary, whereas an increase in the Risk Weighted Assets does not temporally precede any 
significant change in Fiduciary. 
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[TABLE V] 
 
4.5. FRANCHISE VALUE  
 We find that fiduciary activities lower banks’ credit risk.  One plausible channel for 
explaining this finding is a bank’s franchise value. In commercial banking, the relationship 
with clients forms a core part of intangible assets known as franchise or charter value. Banks’ 
clients can be classified into two main groups: ‘core’ deposit holders / loan takers and clients 
of fee-based services such as fiduciary. The relationship with these clients is valuable for 
banks since they provide stable financial resources and income as well as soft information.  
In this section, we explore the relationship between non-interest income activities and 
franchise value. We adopt the following model for our analysis based on De Jonghe and 
Vennet (2008):  
Franchise_Valuei,t          = f(∑   
 
   ×Non-interest_Income_Activitiesk,i,t, Core_Depositi,t,  
Credit_Riski,t, Inefficiencyi,t, Capitali,t, Market_Sharei,t,  
HHIj,t, Home_Price_Growthj,t, Income_Growthj,t) + Ɛi,t                         (5) 
 
Where individual banks, time dimension and states are represented by i, t and j subscripts, 
respectively. We use the market to book value of equity capital (Market to Book Value) as the 
primary proxy for bank franchise value and Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q) as an alternative indicator 
(Keeley, 1990 and Gonzalez, 2005). Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of  equity 
capital plus the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. 
Variations in franchise value (Franchise Value) are modelled in Equation (5) as a function of 
our variables of interest, namely income shares from non-interest income activities, and a set 
of bank and state-level controls. At the bank level, we control for Core Deposit, Credit Risk, 
Inefficiency, Capital and Market Share. Core deposits are a stable source of funding 
representing clients’ relationships and these are expected to increase bank charter value. 
Banks with higher credit risk and inefficiency are expected to have lower franchise values. 
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We also control for capital strength using the equity capital to assets ratio as banks with less 
capital are likely to be more risky and hence have lower franchise value. Market share is 
expected to be positively linked to charter value (Opler and Titman, 1994). We also include 
HHI, Home Price Growth and Income Growth to control for state-level heterogeneity.  
We estimate the Franchise Value model (Equation (5)) using 1,882 quarterly panel 
data of 187 listed Non-Micro Commercial Banks and the fixed effects technique. Since the 
dimensions of our panel data are not extremely unbalanced, following Petersen (2009) and 
Thompson (2011) we cluster standard errors at both bank and time levels. Table VI presents 
the estimation results.  
In the first column we regress Market to Book Value on our variables of interest, 
namely Fiduciary, Life Insurance, Other Insurance, Loan Servicing, Loan Sale and Service 
Charge. We attempt to capture bank-level heterogeneity by including Core Deposit, Credit 
Risk, Inefficiency, Capital and Market Share in columns (2) to (6), respectively. In column 
(7), we include state-level control variables, namely, HHI, Home Price Growth and Income 
Growth. Column (8) displays the result when we scale the non-interest income items by total 
assets in lieu of total operating income as a robustness check. In all specifications, among 
various non-interest income activities, Fiduciary depicts a positive relationship with our proxy 
for Franchise Value. The relationship is also economically significant. Fiduciary activities on 
average account for about 0.9% of total operating income. A one percent increase, evaluated 
at the mean, in the income share of Fiduciary in total net operating income increases Market 
to Book Value on average, by 15.81%. The average Market to Book Value is 126.7%, so the 
effect is economically significant and equal to a 12.5% (12.5%=
      
      
) rise in the average 
Market to Book Value.  
The results also show that Core Deposit has a positive association with charter value. 
Banks with more Credit Risk or Inefficiency have on average lower Franchise Value. 
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Moreover, we observe that Franchise Value is higher in states with less concentrated markets, 
or those which experience greater home price or personal income growth. In columns (9) and 
(10), we use Tobin’s Q as the alternative proxy in lieu of Market to Book Value and re-
estimate our model with the same specifications as of columns (7) and (8). The results support 
our previous finding: an increase in the income share of fiduciary activities increases banks’ 
franchise value.  
[TABLE VI] 
 
4.6. COST COMPLEMENTARITIES  
The linkage of the non-interest income activities with loan quality and spreads may be 
due to informational and/or cost synergies. In this section, we investigate whether pair-wise 
cost complementarity exists between lending and the non-interest income activities that might 
contribute to joint production
17
. As such, we examine whether the marginal cost of producing 
loans decreases when they are generated jointly with non-interest income activities. Appendix 
A2 illustrates our multi-product cost function from which marginal costs are derived.  
In a multi-product firm the pair-wise cost complementarity (PCC) between two 
products exists when an increase in product A lowers the marginal cost of producing product 
B (Clark, 1988). The measure of cost complementarity is as follows:  
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PCC < 0 implies the existence of cost complementarity between products A and B. The 
necessary condition for the existence of cost complementarity (PCC<0) is: 
       
      
          
                                                                                                                     (7) 
                                                 
17
 Informational synergy analysis requires detailed data on clients’ relationship which are not available.  
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PCC = 0 implies the non-jointness or absence of cost complementarities. At any non-zero 
production level of YA and YB, 
  
    
  . Hence, non-jointness requires: 
[
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)]                                                                                                   (8) 
PCC > 0 implies existence of diseconomy of joint production. 
 Table VII illustrates the empirical results on cost complementarity between the non-
interest income activities and lending (secured and unsecured loans (Y1 & Y2)) for Micro and 
Non-Micro Commercial Banks. In the first two rows we use stochastic frontier analysis to 
estimate our cost function which is defined on the basis of the intermediation approach that 
assumes banks as intermediaries (Berger and Mester, 1997 among others). The first three 
columns display the analysis of Non-Micro Commercial Banks.  
 In column (1), the first row, the result shows that the necessary condition for the 
existence of diseconomies of joint production between non-interest income activities and 
secured loans is realized, whereas in the second row, we find the necessary condition for the 
existence of cost complementarity between non-interest income activities and unsecured loans. 
However, column (2) shows that the sufficiency condition for the existence of diseconomy of 
joint production or cost complementarity is not fulfilled and highlights non-jointness
18
. In 
column (3) we observe that the marginal cost of secured loans is around 9.7% which is greater 
than the marginal cost of unsecured loans equal to 2.2%. 
 Columns (4) to (6) exhibit the study of Micro Commercial Banks. In column (4), the 
findings indicate that the necessary condition for diseconomies of joint production of non-
interest income activities with secured and unsecured loans is realized. Column (5) shows that 
the sufficiency condition for diseconomies of joint production of non-interest income activities 
                                                 
18
 Normally total cost is much less than the products of loans (whether Secured or Unsecured) with other 
financial services (in our case the non-interest income businesses). Hence, the first component of the measure of 
cost complementarity, 
  
    
  is too small such that its product with the second component makes the measure 
very close to zero, implying non-jointness.  
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with secured and unsecured loans is fulfilled. The marginal cost of secured and unsecured 
loans of Micro Commercial Banks, displayed in column (6), is equal to 5.33% and 5.15%, 
respectively. The effect of diseconomies of joint production is economically meaningful. One 
dollar increase in non-interest income equals 0.12% (0.12%=
        
      
) and 0.09% 
(0.09%=
        
      
) increase in the marginal cost of secured and unsecured loans, respectively. 
[TABLE VII] 
As a robustness check, we also follow the production approach (Berger and DeYoung, 
1997 among others) and include transaction deposits in our model as a further output. The 
results are presented in rows (3) and (4) and are similar to our previous findings, except for 
the secured loans of Non-Micro Commercial Banks, where we find that the necessary 
condition for cost complementarity between secured loans and non-interest income is realized.  
In rows (5) to (8), we replicate our analysis in the first four rows using the fixed effect 
technique for estimation of total cost function in lieu of stochastic frontier analysis. The 
results are in line with our previous findings. Overall, we find that Micro Commercial Banks 
suffer from diseconomies of joint production, whereas Non-Micro Commercial Banks do not 
benefit (or suffer) from economies (or diseconomies) of scope.  
 
4.7. FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We find that an increase in income share of fiduciary activities lowers credit risk. As a 
further robustness check and in order to address endogeneity issues, we estimate our model 
(Equation (1)) using the two step system GMM technique introduced by Roodman (2006). 
The technique also performs the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to the stated 
standard errors. For this purpose, we focus on the post-crisis period, since we have relatively 
small time periods which are suitable for application of difference and system GMM 
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techniques. Table A3 of the appendix presents the results, where we define Fiduciary as an 
endogenous variable. 
In the first column we observe that Fiduciary appears with a negative coefficient 
similarly to our previous finding. We run the Arellano and Bond (A.B.) test (1991) for serial 
correlation in the error terms. The null hypothesis is no auto-correlation in the first-
differenced residuals at the second order
19
. The A.B. test result does not reject the null 
hypothesis. We also carry out the Sargan test of over-identification, where the null hypothesis 
is the joint validity of moment conditions. The Sargan (1958) test result rejects the null 
hypothesis. In column (4), we limit the instruments of system GMM estimators to the second 
lag of the dependent variable which reduces the number of instruments from 416 to 234. This 
time, the Sargan test rejects the null merely at the ten percent significance level, whereas our 
finding in the previous column remains almost unchanged. In column (3), we scale the non-
interest income items by total assets in lieu of total net operating income. In this specification 
the result persists and the Sargan test of over-identification does not reject the null hypothesis. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the impact of non-interest income activities on banks' lending in 
terms of credit quality and spread. Agency problems and a potential loss of focus associated 
with diversification into non-interest income businesses may cause deterioration in loan 
quality. Alternatively, expanding client relationships can improve the quality of banks' credit 
by, providing relatively stable financial resources, more soft information, greater cross-selling 
opportunities and (ultimately) improved franchise value. Banks with a wider scope of 
relationships are able to reach more potential borrowers. Moreover, non-interest earnings may 
also influence banks' interest spread through possible cross-subsidization effects.  
                                                 
19
 Rejecting the null hypothesis at the first order does not imply that the moments are not valid, since the first 
difference of independently and identically distributed errors is serially correlated. 
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Using quarterly data on 8,287 U.S. commercial banks between 2003 and 2010 we 
study smaller commercial banks with less than $100 million of total assets (‘micro’ 
commercial banks) separately from larger institutions that have developed a broader array of 
non-interest lines of businesses (‘non-micro’ commercial banks). Overall, our analysis of non-
micro commercial banks shows that an increase in the income share of fiduciary activities in 
total operating income lowers credit risk. The impact is more pronounced during the post-
crisis period. The results suggest that fiduciary activities induce banks’ managers to behave 
more prudently in lending, because such activities increase banks’ franchise value as shown 
by our further investigation. The other non-interest income activities which may be thought to 
have influence on banks’ lending – such as service charges on deposit accounts - do not 
appear to have any robust relationship with the quality of bank lending. 
We find little evidence to support the prevalent view in the literature that there is 
cross-subsidization between traditional intermediation and non-interest income activities 
except for fiduciary in the post-crisis period where we observe that a higher income share of 
fiduciary activities is associated with lower lending-deposit spreads.  
The analysis of micro commercial banks provides us with little evidence of any link 
between our non-interest income variables and credit risk. Finally, we investigate whether 
pair-wise cost complementarity or alternatively diseconomies of joint production exist 
between lending (both secured and unsecured) and non-interest income activities. We do not 
find any evidence to support the existence of cost complementarity. Our results even show 
that micro commercial banks actually suffer from diseconomies of joint production. 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1. Variable Description  
 
This table presents description of variables used in this study. 
Dependent Variables Description 
Non-performing Loans 
The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. Non-performing loans consist of non-accrual loans and 
loans which are past due for 90 days or more and still accruing. 
Loan Loss Reserve 
The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. Loan loss reserve is determined by managers for the loan 
portfolio, including both performing and impaired loans.  
Loan Loss Provision 
The ratio of loan loss provision to average gross loans. Loan loss provision is the expense that banks 
incur to increase the loan loss reserve or writing off a loan. It can be negative, when the required loan 
loss reserve is lower than the existing level. 
Risk Weighted Assets 
The ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets. Risk weighted assets are defined by the Basel Accord to 
measure the riskiness of banks’ assets, including off balance sheet items. 
Spread 
Net interest spread equals to (Interest income / average earning assets) – (interest expense / average 
interest-bearing liabilities). 
Market to Book Value The market value of equity capital divided by total book value of equity capital. 
Tobin’s Q 
The market value of equity capital plus the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of 
total assets. 
Variable of Interest  
Fiduciary  Income from fiduciary activities. 
Life Insurance 
Earnings on/increase in value of cash surrender value of life insurance plus fees and commissions from 
annuity sales. 
Other Insurance Services 
Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and income from other insurance 
activities. 
Loan Servicing Net servicing fees. 
Loan Sale Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases and net securitization income. 
Service Charge 
Service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices, income and fees from the printing and sale of 
checks, income and fees from automated teller machines and bank card and credit card interchange fees. 
Control Variables  
Capital Equity capital to asset ratio. 
Inefficiency Total non-interest expense divided by total operating revenue. 
Core Deposit The share of core deposits in total liabilities. 
Liquid Asset  The ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities. 
Interest Rate Risk The difference between the annualized federal funds rate and the implicit interest rate of deposits.  
Loan Commitment The ratio of face value of unused credit lines and loans commitment to total assets. 
Loan Growth Quarterly growth rate of gross loans. 
Wage The salaries and employee benefits divided by number of full time equivalent employees. 
Market Share The share of a bank’s total assets in the total assets of banks aggregated at the state-level.  
Size Logarithm of total assets. 
Log(Age) Logarithm of bank’s age. 
HHI 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is a proxy for market concentration: 
       ∑ (                 ∑                  
 
   ⁄ )
  
    where individual banks, time dimension and 
U.S. states in which they operate are represented by i, t and j subscripts, respectively. It has a value 
between zero and one. Higher values show that the market is more concentrated. 
Home Price Index Growth 
Quarterly growth rate of home price index per state, retrieved from the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight. 
Personal Income Growth Quarterly growth rate in personal income per state, collected from Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Other Non-interest Income Activities 
Venture Capital Venture capital revenue. 
Securities Brokerage Fees and commission from securities brokerage. 
Investment Banking Investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions. 
Trading 
Trading revenue and net change in the fair values of financial instruments accounted for under a fair 
value option. 
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Other Assets Sales 
Net gains (losses) on sales of other real estate owned, net gains (losses) on sales of other assets 
(excluding securities), rent and other income from other real estate owned. 
Other Activities Other non-interest income. 
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Appendix A2. Cost Complementarities Analysis – Cost Function & Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Using the intermediation approach (Berger and Mester, 1997 among others), we set-up 
the following multi-product cost function with a trans-logarithmic functional form (Berndt 
and Christensen, 1973): 
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Wherein TC
 
is the total costs including total interest and non-interest expenses; Y is the 
output vector consisting of: 
Y1 = loans secured on real estate, 
Y2 = loans unsecured,  
Y3 = securities plus federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell,  
Y4 = total nominal value of off-balance sheet items,  
Y5 = the income from the non-interest income activities (Fiduciary, Life Insurance, Other 
Insurance Services and Loan Servicing),  
Y6 = the income from service charges on deposit accounts; 
W is the input price vector comprising:  
W1 = salary expenses divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees,  
W2 = expenses of premises and fixed assets divided by total fixed assets,  
W3 = total interest expense divided by interest-bearing liabilities.  
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Z is the total capital equity and is added to the model to control for unmeasured cost of equity 
capital. Banks with higher equity capital have lower total costs as they have less debt 
financing and hence interest expense, assuming all other factors equal (Hughes and Mester, 
2013). 
We consider the homogeneity and symmetry assumptions which require:  
∑   
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                                                 (A2-2) 
                                                                                                                            (A2-3) 
We also impose input price homogeneity restrictions (an increase in all input prices 
increases the total costs by the same percentage) on the cost function parameters by dividing 
all input prices (W1 and W2) and total costs (TC) with one other factor price (W3). 
The total cost function is estimated using a stochastic frontier approach introduced by 
Aigner et al. (1977) which fits the cost function to best practice banks. This approach assumes 
that the error term (ɛ) has two components which are independently distributed: One 
idiosyncratic error (or random noise) term with a symmetric distribution (ʋ) and the 
inefficiency term with a strictly nonnegative distribution (u). We assume that the inefficiency 
component follows a time-varying decay model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992),  
so       (    )   . Ti is the last period in the i
th
 panel and ƞ is the parameter to be 
estimated. Table A2 presents the descriptive statistics of the total costs, output and input price 
vectors and total equity capital for Micro and Non-Micro Commercial Banks.  
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TABLE A2. Cost Complementarities Analysis - Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents general descriptive statistics of total costs, output vectors, input price vectors and capital equity for Micro 
and Non-Micro Commercial Banks. Micro Commercial Banks are defined as banks with less than $100 million in total assets. 
Non-Micro Commercial Banks are commercial banks with total assets above $100 million. 
Variables Non-Micro Commercial Banks 
 
Micro Commercial Banks 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TC 96,467 73,245 419,831 2,240 5,958,665  37,668 3,112 1,404 331 9,753 
Y1 96,467 610,398 2,858,554 1,948 37,300,000  37,668 25,814 15,838 375 86,568 
Y2 96,467 264,756 1,974,595 3 29,100,000  37,668 4,723 5,959 2 37,054 
Y3 96,467 322,192 1,784,309 575 25,200,000  37,668 16,673 11,261 62 68,285 
Y4 96,467 417,532 4,549,868 10 74,000,000  37,668 1,401 2,077 1 15,817 
Y5 96,467 7,717 79,940 1 1,418,112  37,668 73 169 1 3,680 
Y6 96,467 6,840 41,682 9 586,454  37,668 263 199 3 1,321 
Y7 96,467 136,053 616,435 452 8,637,374  37,668 15,820 8,587 143 53,050 
W1 (%) 96,467 56.44 16.32 26.91 179  37,668 50.22 12.09 22.86 126 
W2 (%) 96,467 30.33 35.49 4.81 588  37,668 37.51 51.97 3.74 1,067 
W3 (%) 96,467 2.46 0.87 0.38 5.08  37,668 2.41 0.80 0.45 5.00 
Z 96,467 168,069 1,035,367 4,123 14,800,000  37,668 6,702 3,155 705 23,550 
TC
 
is the total costs including total interest and non-interest expenses; Y1 = Loans secured by real estate; Y2 = Loans 
unsecured on real estate; Y3 = Securities plus federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell; Y4 = 
total off-balance sheet items; Y5 = the non-interest income activities, including Fiduciary, Life Insurance, Other Insurance 
Services and Loan Servicing; Y6 = Service Charge; Y7 = Total transaction accounts (including total demand deposits); W1 = 
salary expenses divided by number of full-time equivalent employees; W2 = expenses of premises and fixed assets divided by 
total fixed assets; W3 = total interest expense divided by interest-bearing liabilities. Z = the total capital equity. Total costs 
(TC), output vectors (Ys) and capital equity (Z) are in million $ and the input prices (Ws) are in percentage.  
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Table A3. Credit Risk Model – Further Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports estimations of Credit Risk model (Equation (1)) using dynamic panel setting and quarterly data on 3,489 
Non-Micro Commercial Banks during the post-crisis period. Non-Micro Commercial Banks are defined as commercial banks 
with total assets above $100 million. We use Non-performing Loans as our Credit Risk proxy and regress it on its lagged 
value, our variables of interest and a set of control variables. We estimate our model using two step system GMM technique 
introduced by Roodman (2006) and define our variable of interest, i.e. Fiduciary, as endogenous. 
The first column illustrates the estimation of Credit Risk model where we regress the Non-performing Loans on Fiduciary, 
Life Insurance, Other Insurance Services, Loan Servicing, Loan Sale and Service Charge while controlling for bank-level 
(Capital, Inefficiency, Risk Weighted Assets, Loan Commitment, Loan Growth, Size and Log(Age)) and state-level (HHI, 
Home Price Growth and Income Growth) heterogeneities and year 2010 dummy.  
We perform the Arellano and Bond (AB) test (1991) for serial correlation in the error terms and Sargan test of over-
identification, where the null hypothesis is joint validity of moment conditions. The Sargan (1958) J test result rejects the null 
hypothesis. In column (2), we limit the instruments of system GMM estimators to the second lag of dependent variable to 
reduce the number of instruments from 416 to 234. The results show that Sargan test rejects the null merely at 10 percent 
significance level. In column (3) we scale the non-interest income items by total assets in lieu of total net operating income 
and estimate our model the same specifications and techniques used in the column. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
L. Credit Risk (α1) 0.924*** 0.921*** 0.916*** 
 (90.88) (76.00) (75.16) 
Fiduciary (α21) -0.029** -0.032*** -0.902*** 
 (-2.48) (-2.65) (-3.56) 
Life Insurance (α22) -0.020** -0.013 -0.454** 
 (-2.28) (-1.57) (-2.16) 
Other Insurance (α23) -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.259** 
 (-3.44) (-3.16) (-2.21) 
Loan Servicing (α24) -0.007 -0.009 -0.117 
 (-0.92) (-1.18) (-0.73) 
Loan Sale Income (α25) -0.008*** -0.006** -0.096* 
 (-2.88) (-2.03) (-1.65) 
Service Charge (α26) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.169*** 
 (-2.65) (-2.89) (-5.50) 
Capital (α3) -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (-6.50) (-6.96) (-7.06) 
Inefficiency (α4) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (7.29) (6.44) (6.21) 
Risk Weighted Assets (α5) 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.59) (3.15) (3.44) 
Loan Commitment (α6) -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (-4.49) (-3.89) (-3.94) 
Loan Growth (α7) 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (3.76) (4.12) (3.79) 
Size (α8) 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.106*** 
 (8.03) (7.56) (8.30) 
Log(Age) (α9) -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.049*** 
 (-4.45) (-4.75) (-4.72) 
HHI (α10) 0.201*** 0.179*** 0.164*** 
 (3.41) (3.25) (2.97) 
Home Price Growth (α11) -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.020*** 
 (-3.57) (-3.78) (-3.58) 
Income Growth (α12) -0.076*** -0.059*** -0.064*** 
 (-12.58) (-9.01) (-9.73) 
Year 2010 (α13,7) 0.086*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 
 (4.63) (6.69) (6.66) 
Constant (α0) 0.204*** 0.182*** 0.185*** 
 (14.34) (11.37) (11.49) 
    
Observations 23,211 23,211 23,211 
Number of Banks 3,489 3,489 3,489 
    
AB test for AR (1) -21.97*** -20.71*** -20.65*** 
AB test for AR (2) -0.17 -0.10 -0.13 
Sargan Test 762*** 242* 238 
Number of Instruments 416 234 234 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
 
PANEL A. Bank-level Indicators 
 
This table illustrates general descriptive statistics of U.S. commercial banks for the period of 2003-2010. Non-Micro 
Commercial Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets above $100 million. Micro Commercial Banks are 
defined as banks with less than $100 million in total assets. 
 
 
 Non-Micro Commercial Banks  Micro Commercial Banks   
 Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  T-Stat.† 
G
en
er
al
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
Total Assets (mil. $)  130,884 1,364 8,203 6.06 126,000  80,277 55 27 5.96 816  57.7*** 
Non-performing Loans (%)  130,868 1.12 2.13 0.00 13.86  80,188 0.92 1.65 0.00 10.44  24.3*** 
Loan Loss Reserve (%)  130,868 1.44 0.75 0.00 5.46  80,188 1.55 0.89 0.00 6.85  -28.8*** 
Loan Loss Provision (%)  130,871 0.56 0.98 -0.81 6.18  80,188 0.35 0.75 -1.88 4.74  53.6*** 
Risk Weighted Assets (%)  130,884 71.73 12.97 1.23 106.24  80,277 65.32 13.99 0.39 126.69  104.9*** 
Spread (%)  130,884 3.54 0.87 0.69 7.71  80,267 3.67 0.85 0.62 8.05  -31.5*** 
Capital (%)  130,884 10.07 3.06 0.01 25.71  80,277 11.46 3.97 0.11 30.41  -84.9*** 
Inefficiency (%)  130,727 67.10 18.89 0.80 167.16  80,237 72.14 20.56 0.00 194.28  -56.4*** 
Core Deposits (%)  130,884 71.24 15.03 0.00 99.99  80,277 78.56 12.72 0.00 100.00  -120*** 
Liquid Assets (%)  130,884 25.95 16.17 0.00 95.08  80,277 32.47 19.93 0.00 122.10  -78.2*** 
Interest Rate Risk (%)  130,687 -0.15 1.52 -3.71 5.26  80,144 -0.09 1.59 -3.49 5.25  -9.13*** 
Loan Commitment (%)  130,884 3.47 4.50 0.00 26.13  80,277 1.42 2.58 0.00 14.74  132.5*** 
Loan Growth (%)  130,860 2.02 5.37 -19.09 30.00  80,262 1.25 6.11 -24.27 33.13  29.2*** 
Wage (thou. $)  130,739 58.31 18.30 0.04 150.18  80,194 51.50 14.20 0.44 126.09  95.6*** 
Age  130,884 65.59 44.77 3.00 227.00  80,277 75.99 37.11 3.00 171.75  -57.7*** 
Market Share (%)  130,884 0.70 1.73 0.00 10.92  80,277 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.64  129.9*** 
Non-interest Income (%)  130,729 17.53 11.68 -21.75 80.71  80,237 14.08 8.91 -15.18 62.23  76.6*** 
N
o
n
-i
n
te
re
st
 I
n
co
m
e 
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
Fiduciary Activities (%)  130,729 0.90 2.48 0.00 15.06  80,237 0.06 0.29 0.00 1.79  120.7*** 
Life Insurance (%)  130,729 0.64 1.06 0.00 6.47  80,237 0.40 1.00 0.00 5.88  51.4*** 
Insurance Services (%)  130,729 0.43 1.24 -5.71 7.42  80,237 0.47 1.30 -0.18 7.77  -5.74*** 
Loans Servicing (%)  130,729 0.41 1.15 -2.41 6.76  80,237 0.21 0.77 -0.31 4.79  49*** 
Loan Sales (%)  130,729 1.46 3.51 -3.03 20.75  80,237 0.36 1.38 -0.64 8.22  101.4*** 
Service Charges (%)  130,729 8.40 5.43 -20.23 38.32  80,237 8.62 5.27 -1.32 36.07  -9.02*** 
O
th
er
 N
o
n
-
in
te
re
st
 I
n
co
m
e 
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
Securities Brokerage (%)  62,787 0.28 0.67 -2.87 4.02  38,065 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.21  81.7*** 
Investment Banking (%)  62,787 0.09 0.33 0.00 1.93  38,065 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.26  59.7*** 
Trading (%)  130,729 0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.40  80,237 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  54.9*** 
Other Assets Sales (%)  130,729 -0.14 1.83 -10.01 9.40  80,237 0.01 1.45 -7.87 8.02  -20.6*** 
Other Activities (%)  130,729 4.45 5.02 -0.18 32.51  80,237 3.11 3.58 0.00 22.55  71.6*** 
F
ra
n
ch
is
e 
V
al
u
e Market to Book Ratio (%)  2,836 126.7 60.27 0.01 368.5  615 99.2 52.24 2.53 278.9  11.5*** 
Tobin’s Q (%)  2,836 102.9 6.56 83.30 137.2  615 100.2 5.85 88.75 123.2  10.0*** 
† T-Stat.of mean equality test between Non-Micro Commercial and Commercial banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See Table AI for variable definitions.     
 
PANEL B. State-level Indicators 
 
This panel shows the summary statistics of HHI, the growth rate of home price index and personal income across 51 U.S. 
states during the 2003-2010 period.  
Variable   Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HHI (%)   1,472 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.96 
Home Price Index Growth (%)   1,248 0.55 2.32 -12.94 11.10 
Income Growth (%)   1,248 1.06 1.33 -4.30 6.00 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. 
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Table II. Credit Risk Model  
 
This table reports estimations of Credit Risk model (Equation (1)) using quarterly data of 5,106 Non-Micro Commercial 
Banks and 2,792 Micro Commercial Banks during 2003-2010 timespan. Non-Micro Commercial Banks are defined as 
commercial banks with total assets above $100 million, whereas Micro Commercial Banks are banks with less than $100 
million in total assets. We use Non-performing Loans as our primary Credit Risk proxy and regress it on our variables of 
interest and a set of control variables, using dynamic panel setting and fixed effect technique. 
In columns (1) to (7), we estimate the model for Non-Micro Commercial Banks. In the first four columns we use Non-
performing Loans as a proxy for Credit Risk. Column (1) illustrates the estimation of Credit Risk model where we regress the 
Credit Risk proxy on Fiduciary Activities, Life Insurance, Other Insurance Services, Loan Servicing, Loan Sale Income and 
Service Charge while controlling for Capital, Inefficiency and Risk Weighted Assets and year fixed effect controls. In column 
(2), we try to capture heterogeneities caused by loan portfolio management by adding Loan Commitment and Loan Growth. 
Size and Log(Age) are included in the third column. We introduce state-level variables, i.e. HHI, Home Price Growth and 
Income Growth in column (4). In columns (5) to (7), we estimate our model, where we use Loan Loss Reserve, Loan Loss 
Provision and Risk Weighted Assets in lieu of Non-performing Loans as alternative proxies for Credit Risk. Finally, column 
(8) displays the estimations of our model for Micro Commercial Banks, wherein Non-performing Loans is used as the Credit 
Risk proxy. Year dummies are included in the model, but not reported in the table.  
 Non-Micro Banks  Micro Banks 
 
Non-Performing 
Loans 
Non-Performing 
Loans 
Non-Performing 
Loans 
Non-Performing 
Loans 
Loan Loss 
Reserve 
Loan Loss 
Provision 
Risk Weighted 
Assets 
 
Non-Performing 
Loans 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
L. Credit Risk (α1) 0.884*** 0.876*** 0.872*** 0.877*** 0.860*** 0.668*** 0.790***  0.710*** 
 (222.97) (216.50) (213.42) (204.57) (153.41) (91.09) (157.77)  (86.18) 
Fiduciary (α21) -0.013*** -0.013** -0.012** -0.010** -0.004** -0.011*** -0.039*  -0.019 
 (-2.59) (-2.53) (-2.36) (-2.02) (-2.17) (-2.73) (-1.77)  (-0.76) 
Life Insurance (α22) -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.004  0.003 
 (-0.67) (-0.85) (-0.58) (-1.13) (0.55) (1.35) (-0.22)  (0.38) 
Other Insurance (α23) -0.009** -0.008** -0.008* -0.008** -0.003* -0.006 0.023  -0.009 
 (-2.07) (-1.98) (-1.89) (-1.98) (-1.79) (-1.52) (1.00)  (-1.51) 
Loan Servicing (α24) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003  0.015 
 (0.25) (0.36) (0.31) (0.28) (-0.79) (-1.43) (-0.13)  (1.27) 
Loan Sale Income (α25) -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.002 -0.001*** 0.000 0.008  0.006 
 (-2.53) (-2.55) (-2.54) (-1.40) (-2.59) (0.24) (1.28)  (1.01) 
Service Charge (α26) -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.005** -0.004* -0.001 0.001 -0.044***  0.004 
 (-4.10) (-4.20) (-2.51) (-1.76) (-0.74) (0.55) (-4.96)  (1.54) 
Capital (α3) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.010*** -0.027*** 0.105***  -0.019*** 
 (-8.97) (-8.93) (-7.90) (-7.48) (-9.38) (-10.65) (7.81)  (-5.01) 
Inefficiency (α4) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.002  0.005*** 
 (15.51) (15.43) (16.09) (14.89) (12.84) (16.08) (1.42)  (9.87) 
Risk Weighted Assets (α5) -0.002** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.001**   0.002** 
 (-1.98) (2.05) (2.80) (1.55) (0.27) (1.97)   (2.30) 
Loan Commitment (α6)  -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.012*** 0.266***  -0.013*** 
  (-10.50) (-10.50) (-9.83) (-7.02) (-8.11) (28.89)  (-4.21) 
Loan Growth (α7)  -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.130***  -0.007*** 
  (-10.22) (-9.89) (-7.94) (-24.19) (-11.37) (29.82)  (-8.89) 
Size (α8)   0.191*** 0.183*** 0.036*** 0.110*** -1.781***  0.048 
   (8.21) (7.49) (4.25) (5.86) (-12.65)  (0.94) 
Log(Age) (α9)   0.276*** 0.253*** 0.062*** 0.143*** 1.316***  0.535*** 
   (7.10) (6.09) (4.77) (5.16) (7.90)  (6.95) 
HHI (α10)    0.036 0.010 -0.051 0.106  0.010 
    (0.65) (0.50) (-1.13) (0.47)  (0.15) 
Home Price Growth (α11)    -0.020*** -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.033***  -0.026*** 
    (-7.85) (-4.49) (-6.09) (-3.90)  (-6.34) 
Income Growth (α12)    -0.015*** -0.004*** 0.001 -0.011  -0.002 
    (-6.23) (-4.78) (0.34) (-1.25)  (-0.55) 
Constant (α0) -0.131*** -0.134*** -0.048*** -0.019* 0.002 -0.033*** -0.782***  -0.035*** 
 (-24.13) (-23.96) (-5.71) (-1.94) (0.66) (-4.55) (-14.57)  (-2.60) 
Observations 125,211 125,211 125,211 108,630 108,630 108,632 108,644  71,094 
R-squared 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.837 0.786 0.595 0.726  0.583 
Number of Banks 5,106 5,106 5,106 4,371 4,371 4,371 4,371  2,792 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table III. Spread Model   
 
This table reports estimations of the Spread model (Equation (2)) using quarterly data of 5,106 Non-Micro Commercial Banks 
and 2,788 Micro Commercial Banks during 2003-2010 period. Non-Micro Commercial Banks are defined as commercial 
banks with total assets above $100 million, whereas Micro Commercial Banks are banks with less than $100 million in total 
assets.  
We use net interest spread (Spread) defined as [(total interest income/average total earning assets) – (total interest 
expense/average total interest-bearing liabilities)] for our study. Columns (1) to (5) present our analysis of Non-Micro Banks. 
In the first column, we regress Spread on our variables of interest, i.e. Fiduciary Activities, Life Insurance, Other Insurance 
Services, Loan Servicing, Loan Sale and Service Charge which are scaled by total assets in lieu of total operating income, 
while controlling for Capital, Inefficiency and year fixed effects. In column (2), we introduce Loan Loss Provision, Liquid 
Assets and Interest Rate Risk to our model. We add Core Deposit, Loan Commitment and Wage to our analysis in column (3). 
Size and Log(Age) are included in the fourth column. Column (5) displays the result when we control for state-level 
heterogeneity by introducing HHI, Home Price Growth and Income Growth. In column (6), we analyse the sub-sample of 
Micro Banks and use the same specification presented in column (5). We estimate our model using fixed effect technique. 
Year dummies are included in the model, but not reported in the table.  
 Non-Micro Banks  Micro Banks 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
L. Spread (β1) 0.766*** 0.748*** 0.739*** 0.736*** 0.735***  0.705*** 
 (136.65) (132.72) (126.33) (126.09) (114.41)  (91.48) 
Fiduciary (β21) 0.078* 0.063 0.055 0.011 0.005  0.402* 
 (1.88) (1.57) (1.36) (0.24) (0.10)  (1.86) 
Life Insurance (β22) 0.142*** 0.127*** 0.109*** 0.075** 0.091**  -0.013 
 (3.67) (3.41) (2.91) (2.00) (2.43)  (-0.25) 
Other Insurance (β23) 0.146*** 0.111** 0.092* 0.076 0.111*  0.117 
 (3.06) (2.25) (1.71) (1.36) (1.88)  (1.35) 
Loan Servicing (β24) 0.068 0.060 0.041 0.034 0.054  0.075 
 (1.60) (1.45) (0.93) (0.76) (1.13)  (0.86) 
Loan Sale Income (β25) 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.032** 0.031** 0.024*  -0.052 
 (3.51) (3.13) (2.57) (2.47) (1.94)  (-1.21) 
Service Charge (β26) 0.249*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 0.193*** 0.183***  0.140*** 
 (13.74) (13.73) (13.66) (10.99) (9.89)  (5.71) 
Capital (β3) 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015***  0.013*** 
 (14.29) (16.10) (15.52) (14.60) (13.96)  (8.43) 
Inefficiency (β4) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005***  -0.006*** 
 (-24.56) (-25.73) (-26.24) (-27.60) (-25.64)  (-24.46) 
Loan Loss Provision (β5)  0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.017***  0.021*** 
  (5.03) (5.22) (5.94) (6.52)  (6.72) 
Liquid Assets (β6)  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***  -0.007*** 
  (-25.62) (-25.30) (-25.40) (-23.25)  (-14.22) 
Interest Rate Risk (β7)  0.001 0.003 0.000 0.004  0.041*** 
  (0.38) (0.87) (0.14) (1.10)  (7.17) 
Core Deposit (β8)   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.002*** 
   (6.41) (5.27) (3.97)  (4.22) 
Loan Commitment (β9)   0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  0.001 
   (4.98) (5.42) (4.90)  (0.70) 
Wage (β10)   0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  0.004*** 
   (11.26) (12.21) (9.95)  (10.92) 
Size (β11)    -0.112*** -0.113***  -0.220*** 
    (-10.67) (-10.36)  (-11.66) 
Log(Age) (β12)    0.027** 0.044***  0.054** 
    (2.26) (3.43)  (2.52) 
HHI (β13)     0.038  0.050* 
     (1.64)  (1.82) 
Home Price Growth (β14)     0.004***  -0.001 
     (4.58)  (-1.13) 
Income Growth (β15)     -0.005***  -0.017*** 
     (-4.06)  (-12.48) 
Constant (β0) 0.011*** 0.042*** 0.062*** 0.034*** 0.027***  0.079*** 
 (4.70) (11.10) (14.26) (6.74) (4.05)  (9.16) 
Observations 125,225 125,024 124,893 124,893 108,407  70,949 
R-squared 0.732 0.739 0.741 0.743 0.742  0.732 
Number of Banks 5,106 5,102 5,095 5,095 4,362  2,788 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks.  ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table IV. Further Issues – Crisis and post-crisis periods  
 
This table reports estimations of Credit Risk and Spread models (Equations (1) & (2)) using quarterly data of 4,371 Non-
Micro Commercial Banks during 2003-2010 timespan. Non-Micro Commercial Banks are defined as commercial banks with 
total assets above $100 million. Columns (1) to (4) illustrate our Credit Risk analysis and column (5) displays the estimation 
of the Spread model. We define three dummy variables, representing pre, acute and post-crisis periods (Pre, Acute and Post) 
and use Acute and Post in lieu of year dummies. We replace Fiduciary with it its interaction terms with Pre, Acute and Post. 
In the first column, we use Non-performing Loans as our primary proxy for Credit Risk and regress it on our variables of 
interest (Pre×Fiduciary, Acute×Fiduciary and Post×Fiduciary), the rest of non-interest income items (Life Insurance, Other 
Insurance Services, Loan Servicing, Loan Sale Income and Service Charge) and a set of bank-level state-level control 
variables, i.e. Capital, Inefficiency, Risk Weighted Assets, Loan Commitment, Loan Growth, Size, Log(Age), HHI, Home Price 
Growth and Income Growth. In column (2), Non-performing Loans is replaced by Loan Loss Reserve. We use Loan Loss 
Provision as the Credit Risk proxy in the third column. In column (4), Risk Weighted Assets as a more generic proxy is 
studied.  
Column (5) displays the regression analysis of our Spread model, wherein the non-interest income items are scaled by total 
assets in lieu of total net operating income. We regress Spread on Pre×Fiduciary, Acute×Fiduciary and Post×Fiduciary), the 
rest of non-interest income activities (Life Insurance, Other Insurance Services, Loan Servicing, Loan Sale Income and 
Service Charge) and a set of bank-level state-level control variables, i.e. Capital, Inefficiency, Loan Commitment, Loan Loss 
Provision, Liquid Assets, Interest Rate Risk, Core Deposit, Wage, Size, Log(Age), HHI, Home Price Growth and Income 
Growth. We estimate our model using dynamic panel setting and fixed effect technique.  
 
Non-performing 
Loans 
Loan Loss 
Reserve 
Loan Loss 
Provision 
Risk Weighted 
Assets 
Spread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.Y 0.883*** 0.863*** 0.669*** 0.803*** 0.754*** 
 (210.25) (155.79) (89.44) (175.83) (127.20) 
Pre×Fiduciary -0.008 -0.006*** -0.016*** -0.001 -0.026 
 (-1.63) (-3.24) (-3.75) (-0.04) (-0.57) 
Acute×Fiducicary -0.014*** -0.004* -0.010** -0.029 0.057 
 (-2.67) (-1.92) (-2.45) (-1.45) (1.16) 
Post×Fiducicary -0.015*** -0.004** -0.019*** -0.051** -0.091* 
 (-2.82) (-2.00) (-3.75) (-2.17) (-1.69) 
Life Insurance 0.005 0.002 0.008** 0.029* -0.016 
 (1.06) (1.12) (2.08) (1.65) (-0.43) 
Other Insurance -0.010** -0.003* -0.006 0.022 0.128** 
 (-2.27) (-1.91) (-1.43) (0.97) (2.19) 
Loan Servicing 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 0.031 
 (0.76) (-0.60) (-0.94) (-0.22) (0.65) 
Loan Sale -0.000 -0.001 0.002** -0.005 0.014 
 (-0.18) (-1.57) (2.05) (-0.79) (1.11) 
Service Charge -0.001 0.000 0.003** -0.040*** 0.170*** 
 (-0.38) (0.14) (2.00) (-4.81) (9.41) 
Capital -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.027*** 0.121*** 0.014*** 
 (-6.71) (-9.63) (-10.83) (9.23) (12.72) 
Inefficiency 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (15.63) (13.01) (16.73) (3.16) (-26.24) 
Risk Weighted Assets 0.002*** -0.000 0.002***   
 (2.60) (-0.33) (3.14)   
Loan Commitment -0.020*** -0.005*** -0.013*** 0.278*** 0.002*** 
 (-10.40) (-7.68) (-8.87) (31.09) (3.31) 
Loan Growth -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.131***  
 (-8.48) (-24.14) (-11.34) (29.84)  
Loan Loss Provision     0.015*** 
     (5.51) 
Liquid Assets     -0.006*** 
     (-22.03) 
Interest Rate Risk     -0.008*** 
     (-6.66) 
Core Deposit     0.001*** 
     (5.20) 
Wage     0.002*** 
     (7.51) 
Size 0.258*** 0.036*** 0.115*** -1.268*** -0.149*** 
 (11.78) (4.83) (6.95) (-11.62) (-14.08) 
Log(Age) 0.286*** 0.060*** 0.107*** 1.688*** 0.019 
 (7.19) (4.67) (3.88) (10.59) (1.47) 
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HHI 0.019 0.012 -0.051 -0.010 0.042* 
 (0.36) (0.61) (-1.13) (-0.05) (1.87) 
Home Price Growth -0.024*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.070*** 0.009*** 
 (-10.02) (-3.58) (-3.73) (-8.85) (12.12) 
Income Growth -0.028*** -0.010*** -0.029*** 0.002 -0.002* 
 (-12.88) (-14.92) (-15.27) (0.24) (-1.73) 
Acute 0.102*** -0.001 0.034*** 0.231*** -0.039*** 
 (11.67) (-0.30) (5.58) (6.60) (-9.71) 
Post 0.092*** 0.059*** 0.158*** -0.212*** 0.052*** 
 (7.89) (15.04) (18.37) (-4.91) (9.47) 
Constant 0.056*** 0.006*** -0.008* -0.033 -0.018*** 
 (9.36) (3.13) (-1.92) (-1.49) (-7.56) 
Observations 108,630 108,630 108,632 108,644 108,407 
R-squared 0.836 0.786 0.591 0.723 0.738 
Number of Banks 4,371 4,371 4,371 4,371 4,362 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
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Table V. Further Issues – Granger Causality Test  
 
This table reports estimations of Credit Risk and Fiduciary models (Equations (6) & (7)) using quarterly data of 4,261 Non-
Micro Commercial Banks during 2003-2010 timespan. Non-Micro Commercial Banks are defined as commercial banks with 
total assets above $100 million. Columns (1) and (2) illustrate our Credit Risk analysis and columns (3) and (4) display the 
estimation of the Fiduciary model.  
In the first column, we use Non-performing Loans as our primary proxy for Credit Risk and regress it on its lagged values 
(three lags) and three lags of Fiduciary, Risk Weighted Assets, Inefficiency and Capital, while controlling for HHI, Home 
Price Growth and Income Growth and year dummies. In column (2), we add the fourth lagged value to our analysis. Column 
(3) illustrates our estimation of the Fiduciary model (Equation (7)), where we regress Fiduciary on its lagged value (three 
lags) and three lags of Credit Risk, three lags of Fiduciary, Risk Weighted Assets, Inefficiency and Capital, while controlling 
for HHI, Home Price Growth and Income Growth and year dummies. In column (4), we add the fourth lagged value to our 
analysis. We estimate our models using fixed effect technique.  
 Credit Risk Credit Risk Fiduciary Fiduciary 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L. Credit Risk 0.883*** 0.881*** 0.003* 0.003* 
 (102.90) (100.29) (1.89) (1.74) 
L2. Credit Risk 0.002 -0.001 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (0.18) (-0.06) (4.52) (4.58) 
L3. Credit Risk 0.026*** 0.013 -0.002 -0.006** 
 (2.70) (1.16) (-1.23) (-2.26) 
L4. Credit Risk  0.021**  0.005*** 
  (2.28)  (2.68) 
Credit Risk (Total) - - 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 - - (21.55) (25.49) 
L. Fiduciary -0.000 0.001 0.683*** 0.666*** 
 (-0.04) (0.20) (22.65) (20.95) 
L2. Fiduciary -0.001 -0.002 0.072*** 0.061*** 
 (-0.20) (-0.30) (3.15) (2.85) 
L3. Fiduciary -0.009* -0.004 0.043*** -0.011 
 (-1.89) (-0.67) (2.78) (-0.73) 
L4. Fiduciary  -0.007  0.083*** 
  (-0.94)  (3.60) 
Fiduciary (Total) -0.010** -0.012** - - 
 (4.24) (5.52) - - 
L. Risk Weighted Assets -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-3.84) (-3.91) (1.37) (1.42) 
L2. Risk Weighted Assets 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.53) (0.34) (-0.65) (-0.47) 
L3. Risk Weighted Assets 0.005*** 0.003* -0.001 -0.000 
 (4.50) (1.88) (-1.52) (-0.04) 
L4. Risk Weighted Assets  0.004***  -0.001* 
  (3.62)  (-1.90) 
Risk Weighted Assets (Total) 0.001 0.003** -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.45) (5.13) (0.48) (1.05) 
L. Inefficiency 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (3.90) (3.76) (-1.26) (-1.18) 
L2. Inefficiency -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 
 (-0.37) (-0.33) (-1.83) (-1.61) 
L3. Inefficiency 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.54) (1.61) (0.32) (1.29) 
L4. Inefficiency  -0.001**  -0.001** 
  (-1.99)  (-2.42) 
Inefficiency (Total) 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (16.42) (8.86) (9.19) (9.30) 
L. Capital -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (-5.28) (-5.62) (-0.80) (-0.77) 
L2. Capital 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.002 
 (1.25) (1.08) (0.79) (0.65) 
L3. Capital 0.007* -0.003 -0.003* -0.002 
 (1.67) (-0.54) (-1.77) (-0.75) 
L4. Capital  0.015***  -0.002 
  (3.58)  (-0.75) 
Capital (Total) -0.026*** -0.010*** -0.003** -0.004** 
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 (12.62) (6.73) (5.61) (5.15) 
HHI 0.082 0.119* 0.015 0.014 
 (1.35) (1.88) (0.61) (0.52) 
Home Price Growth -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-9.93) (-9.81) (-2.57) (-2.48) 
Income Growth -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (-6.86) (-6.69) (3.16) (2.90) 
Constant -0.071*** 0.357*** -0.003 -0.030*** 
 (-7.73) (35.52) (-0.61) (-5.18) 
Observations 99,470 95,014 99,404 94,948 
R-squared 0.835 0.833 0.606 0.584 
Number of Banks 4,261 4,193 4,261 4,192 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
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Table VI. Franchise Value Model   
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the Franchise Value model (Equation (5)) using 1,882 quarterly panel data of Non-Micro Commercial Banks during 2003-2010 period. Non-Micro 
Commercial Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets above $100 million.  
We use the ratio of market to book value of capital equity (Market to Book Value) as the primary proxy for Franchise Value. In the first column, we regress Market to Book Value on our 
variables of interest, i.e. Fiduciary, Life Insurance, Other Insurance, Loan Servicing, Loan Sale and Service Charge which are scaled by total operating income. In column (2) we introduce Core 
Deposits to our model. We add Credit Risk and Inefficiency to our analysis in columns (3) and (4), respectively. Capital is included in the fifth column. Column (6) displays the result when we 
control for Market Share. In column (7) we include state-level control variables, i.e. HHI, Home Price Growth and Income Growth. In column (8), we scale non-interest income items by total 
assets in lieu of total operating income. In columns (9) and (10) we use Tobin’s Q as the alternative proxy for Franchise Value and re-estimate our model with the same specifications of columns 
(7) and (8). Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of capital equity plus book value of total liabilities divided by book value of total assets. We estimate our model using fixed effect technique 
and following Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) we cluster standard errors at both bank and time levels.  
 
Market to Book 
Value 
Market to Book 
Value 
Market to Book 
Value 
Market to Book 
Value 
Market to Book 
Value 
Market to Book 
Value 
Market to Book 
Value 
Market to Book 
Value 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Fiduciary 17.080*** 16.994*** 14.011*** 15.643*** 15.356*** 15.971*** 15.811*** 396.775*** 1.596*** 37.899*** 
 (2.75) (2.91) (2.93) (3.06) (3.09) (3.26) (3.30) (3.22) (3.14) (3.09) 
Life Insurance -24.074*** -22.133*** -18.641*** -18.017*** -18.161*** -18.332*** -6.747* -169.125* -0.575 -15.904* 
 (-4.71) (-4.27) (-4.31) (-4.17) (-4.15) (-4.17) (-1.73) (-1.72) (-1.59) (-1.68) 
Other Insurance 8.629 8.577 4.062 4.599 5.029 5.229 2.389 52.688 -0.078 1.989 
 (1.12) (1.15) (0.74) (0.79) (0.87) (0.91) (0.44) (0.46) (-0.12) (0.17) 
Loan Servicing -11.733* -9.373* -6.182 -5.299 -5.143 -5.827 -1.308 45.370 -0.266 7.169 
 (-1.93) (-1.73) (-1.36) (-1.18) (-1.10) (-1.27) (-0.30) (0.35) (-0.49) (0.41) 
Loan Sale 0.004 -0.139 0.423 0.376 0.369 0.375 0.442 13.253 0.049 2.549 
 (0.00) (-0.08) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.29) (0.55) (0.29) (0.93) 
Service Charge -6.551*** -6.722*** -5.054*** -3.933*** -3.843*** -3.941*** -2.589 -51.530 -0.355** -5.920 
 (-3.46) (-3.55) (-3.44) (-2.70) (-2.62) (-2.67) (-1.53) (-1.34) (-2.24) (-1.62) 
Core Deposit  0.757* 0.889*** 0.981*** 0.980*** 0.950*** 0.681** 0.722** 0.056 0.058 
  (1.85) (2.72) (2.98) (2.94) (2.85) (2.10) (2.25) (1.50) (1.57) 
Credit Risk   -18.832*** -17.545*** -16.811*** -16.981*** -17.639*** -17.626*** -1.496*** -1.495*** 
   (-7.65) (-7.11) (-6.24) (-6.22) (-4.32) (-4.33) (-3.57) (-3.59) 
Inefficiency    -0.365*** -0.341** -0.344** -0.197 -0.260** -0.017 -0.026 
    (-2.84) (-2.50) (-2.52) (-1.44) (-1.98) (-1.02) (-1.53) 
Capital     1.213 1.029 -0.422 -0.306 0.221 0.226 
     (1.02) (0.86) (-0.27) (-0.20) (1.18) (1.21) 
Market Share      -5.982 -9.079* -8.877* -0.604 -0.573 
      (-0.99) (-1.70) (-1.66) (-1.16) (-1.10) 
HHI       -97.505*** -95.357*** -8.049** -7.632** 
       (-2.75) (-2.67) (-2.39) (-2.30) 
Home Price Growth       5.056*** 5.041*** 0.595*** 0.594*** 
       (3.70) (3.68) (4.15) (4.18) 
Income Growth       4.815*** 4.950*** 0.535*** 0.556*** 
       (3.21) (3.28) (3.60) (3.70) 
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Constant 75.834 -44.622 61.040 56.492 51.817 48.943 -17.946 20.019 -5.780 1.996 
 (0.82) (-0.50) (0.86) (0.74) (0.69) (0.65) (-0.26) (0.97) (-0.71) (1.04) 
           
Observations 2,834 2,834 2,834 2,834 2,834 2,834 1,882 1,882 1,882 1,882 
R-squared 0.557 0.565 0.628 0.634 0.635 0.637 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.709 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table VII. Cost Complementarities Analysis 
 
This table reports Cost Complementarities analysis (Equation (3)), between the non-interest income activities and loans 
(secured and unsecured loans (Y1 & Y2)) for Micro and Non-Micro Commercial Banks. Micro Commercial Banks are 
defined as banks with less than $100 million in total assets. Non-Micro Commercial Banks are commercial banks with total 
assets above $100 million. 
The first three columns present the analysis for the Non-Micro Commercial Banks and columns (4) to (6) exhibit the results 
for Micro Commercial Banks. Columns (1) and (4) display the necessary condition for the existence of cost complementarities 
or diseconomy of joint production between the non-interest income activities and secured or unsecured loans. In columns (2) 
and (5) the measure of cost complementarities (or diseconomy of joint production) are illustrated. See Table A1 for variable 
definitions. In the first four rows we use stochastic frontier analysis to estimate our total cost function, whereas rows (5) to (8) 
exhibit the results when we employ the fixed effect technique for our estimations. We adopt two cost functions: 
intermediation approach (Berger and Mester, 1997 among others) and production approach (Berger and DeYoung, 1997 
among others). 
    Non-Micro Commercial Banks  Micro Commercial Banks 
    NC_PCC(Yi, Y5) PCC(Yi, Y5) 
Marginal 
Cost 
 NC_PCC(Yi, Y5) PCC(Yi, Y5) 
Marginal 
Cost 
    (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
S
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er
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A
p
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ro
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h
 (1) 
Secured Loans  
(Y1) 
0.000382 0.000000 0.0969  0.008652 0.000063 0.0533 
(2) 
Unsecured Loans 
(Y2) 
-0.000586 0.000000 0.0220  0.000132 0.000048 0.0515 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
A
p
p
ro
ac
h
 (3) 
Secured Loans  
(Y1) 
-0.000870 0.000000 0.1088  0.008577 0.000063 0.0851 
(4) 
Unsecured Loans 
(Y2) 
-0.000533 0.000000 0.0250  0.000117 0.000034 0.0573 
F
ix
ed
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ff
ec
t 
T
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h
n
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 (5) 
Secured Loans 
(Y1) 
0.000818 0.000000 0.0953  0.009879 0.000087 0.0614 
(6) 
Unsecured Loans 
(Y2) 
-0.000625 0.000000 0.0176  0.000331 0.000071 0.0589 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
A
p
p
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ac
h
 (7) 
Secured Loans 
(Y1) 
-0.000220 0.000000 0.1080  0.009922 0.000093 0.0880 
(8) 
Unsecured Loans 
(Y2) 
-0.000576 0.000000 0.0216  0.000302 0.000066 0.0728 
 
 
